

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENTI 01982 180918 Z

10

ACTION L-03

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-09 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 OMB-01 IO-12 INRE-00 DPW-01

RSR-01 T-03 /082 W

----- 085288

O 180655 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3100

S E C R E T VIENTIANE 1982

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS, PINT, PGOC, LA

SUBJECT: PACE OF LAO NEGOTIATIONS: DRAFT MILITARY PROTOCOL

REF: STATE 049922

BEGIN SUMMARY: AFTER PASSING OUR DRAFT PROTOCOL TO PHENG PHONGSAVAN, WE LEARNED THAT CHIEF RLG MILITARY NEGOTIATOR GENERAL BOUNTHIENG HAD PRODUCED A DRAFT PROTOCOL OF HIS OWN. UPON TRANSLATION, IT PROVED TO BE A DISASTER, FORBIDDING THE ENTRY OF MILITARY AID PERMANENTLY, PROVIDING NO MODALITIES FOR TROOP WITHDRAWAL, PRISONER RELEASE OR MIA SEARCH, BOXING IN THE ICC WITH RESTRICTIONS AND ACCORDING POWER TO "LOCAL AREA COMMANDERS" TO INSPECT AND DECIDE ON SUCH MATTERS AS RESUPPLY CORRIDORS TO FRIENDLY ENCLAVES. WE SUGGESTED TO SOUVANNA THAT GKUR DRAFT WAS BETTER, AND HE AGREED TO DIRECT HIS NEGOTIATORS TO SET BOUNTHIENG'S DRAFT ASIDE. IT THUS PROVED EXTREMELY FORTUITOUS THAT WE HAD HAD OUR DRAFT READY TO MEET PHENG'S DEADLINE. OTHERWISE, THE RLG WOULD HAVE WORKED FROM BOUNTHIENG'S DRAFT ALONE, AND UNDERCUT BOTH USG AND RLG VITAL INTERESTS.

END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER DCM PASSED COPIES OF OUR DRAFT MILITARY PROTOCOL TO PHENG PHONGSAVAN MARCH 15, AND SOUVANNA EXPRESSED HIS APPROVAL  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENTI 01982 180918 Z

AND GRATITUDE, ARMA CALLED ON RLG CHIEF MILITARY NEGOTIATOR GENERAL BOUNTHIENG ON AFTERNOON OF MARCH 16, TO FOLLOW UP ON SUBJECT AT WORKING LEVEL. BOUNTHIENG TOLD ARMA HE HAD RECEIVED COPY OF OUR DRAFT FROM PHENG AND HAD STUDIED IT, BUT BELIEVED IT WAS " TOO COMPLEX" AND " NOT SUFFICIENTLY LAO" FOR ACCEPTANCE BY RLG. BOUNTHIENG THEN SET OUR DRAFT ASIDE AND SHOWED ARMA A DRAFT PROTOCOL WRITTEN IN LAO WHICH HE SAID HIS OWN STAFF HAD PRODUCED FOR PRESENTATION TO LPF NEGOTIATORS MARCH 19. BOUNTHIENG CLAIMED HE HAD CLEARED HIS DRAFT IN T U FAR BUT DID NOT INDICATE WITH WHOM.

2. AFTER OBTAINING ROUGH TRANSLATION OF BOUNTHIENG' S DRAFT MARCH 16, WE QUICKLY DETERMINED THAT IT CONTAINED MANY FEATURES HIGHLY FAVORABLE TO THE LPF, AND OTHER GROSSLY UNFAVORABLE TO US, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO ARTICLE 3( D) ( MILITARY AID), POW/ MIA' S, AND OTHER ASPECTS OF SETTLEMENT. BOUNTHIENG' S DRAFT WAS A CHILDISH EFFORT AT REQIRTING, NOT ELABORATING DETAILS FOR, BASIC VIENTIANE AGREEMENT. IT WAS GROSSLY INCOMPLETE. IT CONTAINED SUCH SILLY REFERENCES AS A PROHIBITION AGAINST " QUARRELLING OR ARGUING IN ANY MANNER," IN ADDITION TO MORE BASIC OBJECTIONABLE FEATURES SUMMARIZED IN PARAGRAPH THREE BELOW.

3. ON ARTICLE 3( D), BOUNTHIENG' S DRAFT READ SIMPLY: " ALL NEW COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE FORBIDDEN ENTRY TO LAOS PERMANENTLY." ANOTHER SECTION ACCORDS FULL AUTHORITY TO RLG/ LPF JOINT COMMISSION TO " STOP ENTRY OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT IF IT CAN." BOUNTHIENG' S DRAFT PROVIDES NO MODALITIES FOR PRISONER RELEASE, OTHER THAN REFERENCE THAT LISTS OF PRISONERS, " LAO AND FOREIGN," MUST BE EXCHANGED BEFORE MAY 22. IT DOES NOT DISCUSS MIA QUESTION AT ALL. IT POSES UNREALISTIC PREMISES FAVORABLE TO THE LPF FOR DETERMINING " ZONES OF TEMPORARY CONTROL," AND CONFERS POWER ON LOCAL AREA COMMANDERS TO DETERMINE AND INSPECT ENTRY CORRIDORS FOR RESUPPLY OF ENCLAVES, AND MATERIAL BEING SUPPLIED. IN REGARD TO ICC, IT REQUIRES THAT BODY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON " ALL MINOR DETAILS OF INVESTIGATIONS AND ESPECIALLY OF REPORTING TO HIGHER LEVELS." BOUNTHIENG' S DRAFT ALSO PROPOSES 47 FIXED TEAM SITES IN LAOS AS POINTS OF JCIA AND ICC OBSERVATION. WHEN BOUNTHIENG FIRST DREW UP HIS LIST TWO WEEKS AGO, WE STUDIED AND FOUND IT EMPLACED DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE NUMBER OF SITES ON PRC ROAD COMPLEX IN NORTH LAOS, WHERE THERE HAS BEEN NO FIGHTING FOR YEARS, AND VIRTUALLY NONE ON KEY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENTI 01982 180918 Z

PASSES AND OTHER HO CHI MINH TRAIL POINTS IN SOUTH LAOS.  
ACCORDINGLY, OVER A WEEK AGO ARMA PROVIDED BOUNTHIENG WITH  
REVISED LIST WHICH WE BELIEVED BETTER MET LAO AND USG NEEDS.  
HOWEVER LIST IN BOUNTHIENG' S PROTOCOL IS HIS ORIGINAL ONE,  
NOT MODIFIED TO REFLECT OUR SUGGESTIONS.

4. AFTER REVIEWING BOUNTHIENG' S DRAFT PROTOCOL IN SOME HORROR,  
WE CONSULTED WITH SOUVANNA AND ADVISED HIM THAT FRANKLY WE  
BELIEVED HE MUST DIRECT HIS NEGOTIATORS TO " LAOCIZE" AND USE  
OUR DRAFT AS THE BASIS FOR TALKS WITH THE LPF, RATHER THAN  
BOUNTHIENG' S DRAFT WHICH WE SAID WE THOUGHT WAS INCOMPLETE.  
SOUVANNA AGREED TO DO SO.

5. EMBOFF DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH DEFENSE MINISTRY DIRGEN GENERAL  
OUDONE SANANIKONE MARCH 17. OUDONE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED THAT  
MORNING THREE DRAFT MILITARY PROTOCOLS FOR STUDY: AN ENGLIS  
DRAFT, WHICH HE PRESUMED WAS OUR WORK, A LAO TEXT FROM  
BOUTHIENG, AND A FRENCH TEXT FROM PHENG PHONGSAVAN.

6. WE HAVE HEARD PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A SINGLE RLG MILITARY  
PROTOCOL IS UNDERWAY AS OF TODAY, MARCH 18, WE DO NOT CLAIM  
OURS IS THE BEST POSSIBLE DOCUMENT, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED IT IS  
FAR BETTER FROM RLG AND USG POINT OF VIEW AS BASIS FOR NEGO-  
TIATIONS THAN THE FOURTH GRADE ESSAY PRODUCED BY BOUNTHIENG. WE  
HAVE STATED TO RLG NEGOTIATORS THAT THEY SHOULD MODIFY OUR  
PAPER AS THEY SEE FIT, BUT WITH RELIGIOUS CARE. WE ARE  
EMPHASIZING THAT DETAILED PROVISIONS OF THIS MILITARY PROTOCOL  
MAY PROVE MORE IMPORTANT TO FATE OF NON- COMMUNIST SIDE IN LAOS  
THAN AMBIGUOUS GENERALITIES OF VIENTIANE 1973 AGREEMENT ITSELF.  
ONCE RLG HAS TABLED ITS DRAFT, WE BELIEVE LPF WILL TAKE  
ISSUE WITH MANY PROVISIONS OF IT. THIS WILL ALSO GIVE US AN  
OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE CHANGES IN THE DOCUMENT UNDER NEGOTIATION  
AS SUGGESTED BY REFTTEL AND INCORPORATE OTHER HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS  
VISITING LEGAL SPECIALIST FROM DEPARTMENT MAY ADVANCE.  
GODLEY

SECRET

\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:**  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 18 MAR 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** martinjw  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973VIENTI01982  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** RR  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** VIENTIANE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730330/aaaahwxu.tel  
**Line Count:** 154  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION L  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 73 STATE 049922  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** martinjw  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 DEC 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03-Dec-2001 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <22 FEB 2002 by martinjw>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** <DBA CORRECTED> srp 971210  
**Subject:** PACE OF LAO NEGOTIATIONS: DRAFT MILITARY PROTOCOL  
**TAGS:** MOPS, PGOV, PINT, LA  
**To:** L  
**SECSTATE WASHDC**  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005